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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court developed the political question doctrine as a
technique to avoid judicial review of an otherwise properly filed case when a
judicial decision in the case would be inappropriate or imprudent.1 It is only
when a case is otherwise properly filed that the technique is instrumental in
declining judicial review.2 Recently, the Supreme Court relied upon the
political question doctrine to avoid adjudication of claims alleging
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering in North Carolina and Maryland.3

*
1
2

3

Professor Linda Sandstrom Simard, Suffolk University Law School. I want to thank the University
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for sponsoring a timely and provocative conference.
Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2002).
Traditional procedural irregularities, such as lack of standing or failure to state a claim, avoid the
necessity of invoking the political question doctrine. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916,
1922 (2018) (avoiding the merits of claims alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering because
plaintiffs lacked standing); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 313 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(dismissing a case alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering for failure to state a claim rather
than by invoking the political question doctrine).
See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (dismissing the cases as nonjusticiable
political questions).
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These claims are, of course, political questions in the colloquial sense that they
involve highly sensitive allegations that concern the fundamental values of our
democracy. But, if these cases were otherwise properly filed, it is important
to consider whether the Court’s invocation of the doctrine was a prudent
judgment or an abdication of its judicial responsibility. Moreover, if these
cases were susceptible to dismissal for a traditional procedural deficiency, why
did the Court choose to decide the cases categorically—that all partisan
gerrymander claims are political questions—rather than merely dismiss these
particular cases? As Professor Louis Henkin cautioned more than fifty years
ago, “[a] doctrine that finds some issues exempt from judicial review cries for
strict and skeptical scrutiny.”4 This caution is as relevant today as it was fifty
years ago.
The irony of the Court’s invocation of the political question doctrine in
partisan gerrymander cases is that it relieves the courts from adjudicating issues
that most demand independent judicial review.5 Indeed, the independence
that is ensured by Article III of the Constitution is intended to protect federal
courts when they are called upon to decide sensitive issues that might raise a
risk of retaliation, particularly by a co-equal branch of the government.6 These
protections ensure that federal judges shoulder the constitutional duty of
judicial review without fear of reprisal. Yet, in Rucho v. Common Cause, the
majority refused to adjudicate claims of unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering, instead suggesting that any available remedy lies in the hands
of the entrenched political bodies accused of wrongdoing.7 This result is
troubling, not only because of the futility of expecting the legislative bodies that
are responsible for the districting map to police their own alleged misconduct,
but also because it sends a signal that the political question doctrine might be
utilized as a convenient escape hatch to avoid adjudication of other sensitive
issues of our day. Indeed, what is to stop the Court from closing the
courthouse doors on large swaths of public law litigation by declaring these
cases to be nonjusticiable political questions?
4
5

6

7

Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976).
See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2523 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he need for judicial review is at its most
urgent in cases like these. ‘For here, politicians’ incentives conflict with voters’ interests, leaving
citizens without any political remedy for their constitutional harms.’ Those harms arise because
politicians want to stay in office. No one can look to them for effective relief.”) (citation omitted).
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (“No one can accuse this Court of having a crabbed view of the reach
of its competence. But we have no commission to allocate political power and influence in the
absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards . . . .”).
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So what should courts do with cases that involve sensitive “political”
questions? In most cases, the answer is simple: courts should treat them like
every other dispute by relying upon traditional tools of adjudication to resolve
the questions presented. When ordinary constitutional interpretation suggests
there is no constitutional violation that is remediable by the courts, there is no
need to invoke the political question doctrine because courts may rely upon
traditional procedural safeguards that test the adequacy of a complaint—lack
of standing or failure to state claim.8 If there are extraordinary situations that
raise a legitimate reason for courts to avoid judicial review of an otherwise
properly filed case, the political question doctrine should be narrowly tailored
to satisfy clear legal principles that ensure courts shoulder the hard work of
judicial review in all but the most extraordinary circumstances. As the next
section illustrates, the criteria that define the modern political question
doctrine are not narrowly tailored or clearly defined.9
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE

The roots of the modern political question doctrine are found in Baker v.
Carr, a case in which the Supreme Court held that allegations of
unconstitutional vote dilution were not political questions shielded from
judicial review.10 In Baker, the Court articulated the defining criteria of the
modern political question doctrine as:
A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an

8

9

10

See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 310 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (preferring to dismiss a partisan gerrymander
claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, noting that “[o]ur willingness to
enter the political thicket of the apportionment process with respect to one-person, one-vote claims
makes it particularly difficult to justify a categorical refusal to entertain claims against this other type
of gerrymandering.”); see also Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1213 (citing courts’ erstwhile reliance on
standing instead of the political question doctrine).
See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the
Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption Analysis,” 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1196 (2002) (criticizing the
modern political question doctrine as dependent “almost entirely on the discretion of the majority of
the Justices, untethered to any legal principles rooted in the Constitution’s structure, theory, history
or early precedent.”).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“A citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by
state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution, when such
impairment resulted from dilution by a false tally . . . .”).
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unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
11

Superficially, the factors appear to be unproblematic—logical restrictions
protecting the separation of powers between the politically elected branches
of government and the independent judicial branch. Yet, a closer look reveals
that these criteria are too elusive to provide a principled limitation for the
doctrine and allow courts to abdicate the judicial responsibility too freely.
The first, and arguably most important, of the Baker criteria asks if there
is a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department.”12 The Constitution defines the powers of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches, and in Marbury v. Madison, the
Court declared that the exercise of these powers is subject to judicial review if
an issue is presented in a case or controversy that satisfies Article III.13 The
challenge in applying the first Baker criteria, therefore, is identifying a
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department” that excludes the opportunity for judicial
review.14
Imagine a case that involves a constitutional provision that confers
discretion on a political branch to carry out constitutional responsibilities.
According to Marbury, the federal courts have the power, indeed the duty, to
interpret the constitutional provision to “say what the law is.”15 If a federal
court interprets the constitutional provision and determines that there has
been no abuse of discretion, the court has made a decision on the merits. No
political question arises because the court is merely engaging in ordinary
constitutional interpretation. Whether the court justifies the conclusion by
determining that the constitutional provision imposes no limits on the exercise
of discretion, or the provision imposes limits but the political branch has not
acted beyond those limits, the court is merely employing ordinary
constitutional interpretation to make a determination on the merits. Political
questions must require something different than ordinary constitutional
interpretation.

11
12
13
14
15

Id. at 217.
Id.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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Professor Louis Henkin long ago opined that a “textual commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department”16 might refer to a constitutional
provision that is “‘self-monitoring’ and not the subject of judicial
review.”17 Ordinary constitutional interpretation requires courts to answer the
question: what is the meaning of a constitutional provision? This is the merits
question. Henkin suggests, in some situations, courts may ask a related
question: who gets to decide the meaning of the constitutional provision?18 In
Marbury v. Madison, the Court emphatically established that it is the judicial
responsibility to interpret the meaning of constitutional provisions.19 While
this ordinarily means that the courts get to decide the merits question, in
extraordinary situations a court may interpret a constitutional provision as
conferring sole power on a political branch to decide the meaning of the
constitutional provision. In essence, a court concludes that the issue is a
subject for non-judicial finality.20 Under this theory, if the law commits a
subject to a non-judicial decisionmaker, the first criteria in Baker v. Carr is
satisfied and the issue is a nonjusticiable political question.
The second Baker criterion “a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it,”21 is inextricably linked to the first
criterion.22 When an issue has been committed to a coordinate political
branch, it should come as no surprise if there is a “lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving”23 the dispute because
the constitutional provision at issue does not intend for judicial review.
Conversely, an absence of manageable standards tends to support a
conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political branch. 24 Of course, in most cases courts engage in
ordinary constitutional interpretation of the sort contemplated in Marbury v.
Madison, and it is assumed that they are capable of identifying manageable
standards for resolving disputes that meet the requirements of Article
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Henkin, supra note 4, at 622–23.
See id. (summarizing the shortcomings of the political question doctrine).
See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”).
See John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2017) (explaining
that the political question doctrine applies in the unusual circumstances where the law commits final
decision of a legal question to a non-judicial decision maker).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993) (describing the two criteria as “not
completely separate”).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (noting that the absence of manageable standards “may strengthen
the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch”).
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III. Indeed, courts have articulated manageable legal standards for vague
constitutional provisions like due process and equal protection and have
tackled the most intractable legal disputes in our nation’s history.25 Thus, the
first two criteria of Baker fit together like a hand in a glove.
The remaining Baker criteria are rarely independently determinative of
the existence of a political question.26 Although the six criteria are listed in the
alternative, the suggestion that any one of them alone would be sufficient to
refuse judicial review of an otherwise properly filed case is implausible. Take,
for example, “the impossibility of deciding [a claim] without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”27 This “criterion”
is nothing more than a restatement of the question: when is a properly filed
case “clearly for nonjudicial discretion”?28 It is equally hard to imagine that
judicial review can be denied solely upon a worry about “expressing the lack
of respect due coordinate branches of government” or an “unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision,” or the “potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments.”29 While these considerations may be relevant in the calculus of
deciphering when there is a “textual commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department,”30 it is difficult to imagine a court refusing to adjudicate
an otherwise properly filed case solely because it may cause embarrassment
or show disrespect to a coordinate branch.
Notwithstanding the illusiveness of the modern political question doctrine,
one thing is clear: the doctrine does not prevent courts from engaging in
ordinary constitutional interpretation.

25

26

27
28
29
30

See id. at 247 (White, J., concurring) (noting that the word “try” in the Impeachment Trial Clause
“presents no greater, and perhaps fewer, interpretive difficulties than some other constitutional
standards that have been found amendable to familiar techniques of judicial construction”).
Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1213 (“[T]he Court has not invoked the more obviously flexible criteria
articulated in Baker v. Carr—the last four of the six on its list—in any recent case, to the point where
it seems fair to say that the only real components of the doctrine are the first two: a textually
demonstrable commitment to the political branches and the lack of judicially manageable
standards.”).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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II. ARE CLAIMS OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
NONJUSTICIABLE POLITICAL QUESTIONS?
In Rucho v. Common Cause,31 the Supreme Court consolidated two direct
appeals from federal district court decisions finding unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering in congressional district maps in North Carolina and
Maryland.32 The Court readily admitted that “[t]he districting plans at
issue . . . are highly partisan, by any measure”33 and that excessive partisan
gerrymandering is “incompatible with democratic principles”34 but nonetheless
focused its analysis on “whether the courts below appropriately exercised
judicial power when they found them unconstitutional as well.”35
The majority unequivocally rejected appellants argument that “the
Framers set aside electoral issues . . . as questions that only Congress can
resolve.”36 Noting that “our cases have held that there is a role for the courts
with respect to at least some issues that could arise from a State’s drawing of
congressional districts,”37 the majority nonetheless concluded that partisan
gerrymander claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal
courts. The majority invoked the doctrine, not because of a textual
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political branch, but rather because
it could find
no legal standards discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments,
let alone limited and precise standards that are clear, manageable, and
politically neutral. Any judicial decision on what is “fair” in this context would
be an “unmoored determination” of the sort characteristic of a political
question beyond the competence of the federal courts.
38

31
32

33

34
35
36
37
38

139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
See id. (adjudicating whether partisan gerrymandering violated the First Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, Section 2 of
the Constitution).
Id. at 2491. The evidence of partisanship was overwhelming. In North Carolina, the co-chair of the
redistricting committee stated “I think electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I
drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the country.” Id. In Maryland, the Governor
testified that he undertook to redraw the districts “to change the overall composition of Maryland’s
congressional delegation to 7 Democrats and 1 Republican by flipping” a district which had been
held by a Republican for nearly two decades. Id. at 2493.
Id. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2658 (2015)).
Id. at 2491.
Id. at 2495.
Id. at 2495–96.
Id. at 2500 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).
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Never before has the Court invoked the political question doctrine based
solely upon its inability to discover legal standards to resolve a case.39 Although
the first two Baker criteria are usually satisfied simultaneously, the Court
decoupled them in this case.
The majority attempted to support its categorical conclusion that all
partisan gerrymander claims are political questions by weaving together
analytical threads that fail to carry the heft of the conclusion. While a review
of the Federalist Papers uncovered no evidence that the Framers intended for
the federal courts to play a role in electoral districting issues,40 this history
stands in stark contrast to the majority’s own conclusion that there is a role for
the courts with respect to one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering
relating to a State’s drawing of congressional districts.41 The majority
uncovered no evidence that the Framers intended to distinguish between
different types of electoral issues, finding some justiciable, while others not.
The majority also noted that “[c]ourts have . . . been called upon to resolve
a variety of questions surrounding districting.”42 Indeed, the Court has
answered the call in cases alleging partisan gerrymandering to reach the merits
of the allegations.43 While nearly all of these cases have agreed that “extreme
partisan gerrymandering . . . violates the constitution,”44 the majority
concluded that these cases “leave unresolved whether . . . claims [of legal right]
may be brought in cases involving allegations of partisan gerrymandering.”45
These cases, in which the Court adjudicated the merits of partisan
gerrymander claims, provide little or no support for the conclusion that it is
impossible to find judicially manageable standards for all partisan gerrymander
claims.

39
40

41
42
43

44
45

See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“For the first time ever, this Court refuses to remedy a
constitutional violation because it thinks the task beyond judicial capabilities.”).
Id. at 2496 (surveying the Framers’ consideration of the electoral districting problem and that though
“‘a discretionary power over elections ought to exist somewhere. . . . [I]t must either have been
lodged wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures, or primarily in the latter,
and ultimately in the former.’ [But] [a]t no point was there a suggestion that the federal courts had a
role to play.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 362 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
Id. at 2495–96.
Id. at 2496.
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (adjudicating partisan gerrymander claims on the
merits); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986) (holding that claims of partisan gerrymandering
are not political questions; League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)
(adjudicating claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering). But see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (dismissing partisan gerrymander claims as nonjusticiable).
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2498 (“Two ‘threshold questions’ remained: standing, which was addressed in Gill, and
‘whether [such] claims are justiciable.’”).
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The majority also reviewed the tests propounded by the lower courts.46 Of
course, the fact that lower courts have proposed tests does not mean the
Supreme Court must accept those tests. But, if lower federal courts, along
with state courts, prior Supreme Court Justices and the dissenting Justices in
this case are all willing and able to identify standards to decipher whether
alleged partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional, the majority’s conclusion
that standards are impossible to decipher is not particularly plausible.
Finally, the majority articulates a laundry list of hypothetical questions
involving partisan gerrymander issues that might arise in the future and might
prove to be challenging to answer.47 Undoubtedly, the questions posed by the
majority will be challenging to answer should they ever arise in a future case.
But, this is beside the point. Article III ensures that courts are empowered to
answer only cases or controversies. Indeed, the Constitution precludes federal
courts from answering hypothetical questions decoupled from a live case or
controversy. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that the majority relies upon a
parade of horribles that have not been raised in a case or controversy, to avoid
addressing the questions that have been properly raised.48
Instead of threading the needle to reach the anomalous conclusion that
there is a role for the courts in deciding some issues arising under the Elections
Clause, but no judicially manageable standards to accomplish the task for
others, the majority could have rejected the categorical declaration that all
partisan gerrymander claims are nonjusticiable political questions and
dismissed the specific claims regarding the district maps in North Carolina and
Maryland for failure to state a claim upon which judicial relief may be granted.
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, a case alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering,
Justice Kennedy took this position to reject the assertion that all partisan
gerrymander claims are political questions.49 Applying such reasoning here
would have avoided any appearance of judicial abdication and still resolved
the cases with the same result, no judicial remedy. So why didn’t the majority
choose this path?
In order to dismiss these claims for failure to state a claim, a court must
accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true to determine if

46
47
48

49

Id. at 2502–06, 2516. (describing the tests as comprised of three basic elements: intent, effects, and
causation).
Id. at 2501.
See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“After dutifully reciting each case’s facts, the majority leaves
them forever behind, instead immersing itself in everything that could conceivably go amiss if courts
became involved.”).
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 310, 312 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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those facts state a plausible legal claim.50 Applying this standard, the majority
would have had to accept the allegations regarding districting maps in North
Carolina51 and Maryland52 as true and conclude that they do not state a
plausible claim for relief. The majority may have been hesitant to make this
ruling on such egregious allegations of fact. Instead, the majority hangs its hat
on the assertion that it is impossible to determine “how much partisan
gerrymandering is too much?” The dissent avoids the hypotheticals and
concludes quite simply, this much is too much.53 By invoking the political
question doctrine, the majority avoided the severity of the facts presented
while maintaining that it “does not condone excessive partisan
gerrymandering.”54
More importantly, the impact of the Court’s decision to invoke the political
question doctrine is much greater than the impact of an individualized
determination that these particular claims fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. By declaring that an entire category of cases—those that
allege partisan gerrymandering—are nonjusticiable political questions the
majority effectively lays a dead hand over all cases that might have alleged
partisan gerrymander claims in the future. This impact is significant. The
majority suggests that it is prudent, indeed necessary to categorize all partisan
gerrymander claims as nonjusticiable political questions. Yet, as Justice
Kennedy stated in Vieth:
It is not in our tradition to foreclose the judicial process from the attempt to
define standards and remedies where it is alleged that a constitutional right is
burdened or denied. . . . Courts, after all, already do so in many instances. A
determination by the Court to deny all hopes of intervention could erode
confidence in the courts as much as would a premature decision to intervene.

55

The Court has struggled with partisan gerrymander claims for decades.
While political classifications in districting alone do not support a justiciable
claim, when such classifications are “applied in an invidious manner or in a
way unrelated to a legitimate legislative objective,” they may support a claim

50
51

52
53
54
55

See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (elaborating upon the standard for pleading
in federal court).
See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509–2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In 2012, Republican candidates won 9
of the State’s 13 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, although they received only 49% of the
statewide vote. In 2014, Republican candidates increased their total to 10 of the 13 seats, this time
based on 55% of the vote.”).
See id. (observing that from 2012 through 2018 Democrats “have never received more than 65% of
the statewide congressional vote,” yet they have won “7 of 8 House seats”).
Id. at 2521.
Id. at 2507.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 309–10 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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for relief.56 After Rucho, the justiciability question will depend upon
distinctions between partisan gerrymander claims that will likely rest upon the
impact felt from political classifications. To the extent that these distinctions
are fact based, courts will be required to evaluate factual allegations relating to
the types and severity of impact caused by partisan gerrymandering in order
to open, or close, the courthouse doors to such claims. In essence, these
distinctions will be indistinguishable from the core functions of judicial review.
In Rucho, the majority admitted that “[e]xcessive partisanship in districting
leads to results that reasonably seem unjust” and “that such gerrymandering is
‘incompatible with democratic principles,’”57 yet threw up its hands because it
could decipher no legal standards to resolve these admittedly serious
problems. We should be thankful that prior justices on the Supreme Court
discovered standards to remedy racial gerrymandering and vote dilution. For
that matter, we should be thankful that prior justices on the Court discovered
standards to decipher unconstitutional conduct in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause that have been instrumental in
advancing justice. To prevent the Court from expanding the reach of the
political question doctrine to shield other sensitive “political” claims from
judicial review, the doctrine should be limited to instances in which there is a
“textual commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”58 The
remaining criteria announced in Baker v. Carr should be relevant only to the
extent they bear upon this determination. In this manner, the political
question doctrine will be narrowed to its core and applicable to only the most
extraordinary situations.
As Professor Henkin cautioned, “a doctrine that finds some issues exempt
from judicial review cries for strict and skeptical scrutiny.”59 This statement
was true 50 years ago, and it remains true today. We should be worried about
a Supreme Court that refuses to engage in the hard work of judicial review,
particularly in those cases where it is most needed.

56
57

Id. at 307.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135

58
59

S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
Henkin, supra note 4, at 600.
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